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IMPROVING THE HANDLING OF CRIMINAL
CASES IN THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE SYSTEM*
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr.t

The subject assigned to me by Dean Cramton is far broader
than at first it may seem. No judicial system can function effectively
in the processing of criminal cases if it is burdened with other
matters that far exceed its capacities. We may discuss separately
proposals dealing directly with the criminal processes, as Dean
Cramton suggested, but our need of reformation is much broader.
Our federal courts of appeals are in critical condition.' In
1964, Professor Charles Alan Wright wrote an article in which he
expressed great alarm over the growing case load in some of the
courts of appeals. 2 His conclusion was that even the most productive, efficient federal court of appeals could not manage a case load
exceeding 80 cases per year per judge. Several of the courts of
appeals, including those of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,
had reached that level, or were close to it. In fiscal 1973, my court
had a case load of 225 cases per year per judge, up from 200 cases
in fiscal year 1972. Professor Wright was not wide of the mark in
1964, for he was thinking in terms of the traditional methods of
processing appeals. The courts of appeals are digesting case loads
soaring far beyond the maximum he envisioned, thus far by
sacrificing some values which should be served if we could. These
include a right to an oral hearing in each case and the right to an
exposition of the court's conclusion. My court would be hopelessly
behind if we orally heard every case or wrote adequate opinions in
every case.3 The immediate situation may not be unendurable, but
further increases cannot be absorbed without the sacrifice of more
important values-and that would soon become intolerable. If we
* This Article was delivered as part of the fifty-sixth Frank Irvine Lecture Series at the
Cornell Law School on October 19, 1973.
f Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. A.B. 1933, Furman
University; LL.B. 1936, Harvard University.
I See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 31 (1973).
2 Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit:A Crisis injudidalAdministration, 42 TEXAS L. REV.
949, 957 (1964).
3 We undertake to explain what we do and why in cases that are not heard orally. After
oral hearings in which the judges have shown their familiarity with the issues, we simply do
not have time to write if writing is solely or primarily for the information of the parties and
the lawyers in the case.
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reach 300 cases per judgeship in two or three years-and it seems
highly probable that we will unless drastic measures are taken-we
may well witness a catastrophic breakdown of the entire system.
For such reasons, the problems need to be attacked along a broad
front so that while solving specific problems, we also limit the input
of cases into the system to its capacity.
In addition to consideration of my own proposal, therefore, I
will have occasion to mention the Chief Justice, Carrington, Frank,
Freund, Friendly, Meador, and Rosenberg, all of whom have
constructive proposals, many of which I heartily endorse. If we can
move at once on all of these fronts, we can achieve a healthy
judicial system that may function effectively in discharging its
essential functions. A bit of tinkering here and there will not
suffice.
My own modest proposal 4 is essentially abandonment of primary reliance upon collateral review of federal questions arising in
criminal prosecutions and the substitution of an efficient system for
prompt direct review. This would require the creation of a new
national court of appeals to review convictions in the federal and
state judicial systems. So that it would not be an entirely specialized
court, I would also have it authorized to hear and decide cases
referred to it for decision by the Supreme Court.
I propose no abandonment of the traditions of the Magna
Charta or of the constitutional guarantee against suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in times when there is neither rebellion nor
invasion. 5 I would preserve the federal writ of habeas corpus in a
dimension far broader than that existing before the Supreme
Court undertook to adapt it to new and, theretofore, unsuspected
uses. That there may be no misunderstanding on this score, let me
briefly sketch the steps by which we came, in 1963, to a system of
collateral, rather than direct, review of federal questions in state
prosecutions.
I
HABEAS

CORPUS

The historic scope of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,
the "Great Writ" of the Magna Charta, was quite narrow. It was
designed to remedy judicially unsanctioned imprisonments by the
" See Haynsworth, A New Court To Improve the Administration ofJustice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841
(1973).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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King, the Privy Council, or other officers of the Crown. Later, it
was used as an instrument for the procurement of bail for persons
held on charges of bailable offenses and entitled to bail. In general,
however, it was a sufficient answer to an application for the writ
that the person was imprisoned under the authority of a court
having jurisdiction.6 It was available if the committing court was
wholly without power to commit, as was the judge who imprisoned
the jurors who acquitted William Penn. 7 In this country, by analogy, the writ was available to one who had committed no punishable offense because the statute he allegedly transgressed was
unconstitutional, 8 and to one upon whom a second sentence was
imposed because the court's power had been completely exhausted
with the imposition of the first sentence. 9
Until very recent years, this was substantially the dimension of
the writ in the United States. Evidence of relaxation of earlier
restrictions, until recently, is slight. It was held in 1923, for example, that a court might be ousted of its jurisdiction if a conviction
was procured by the coercive conduct of a mob and that habeas
corpus was available to release the victim of such an outrageous
proceeding, notwithstanding the facial regularity of the court's
0
order of commitment.'
This limited function of the writ as an instrument for review
of constitutional issues arising in judicial proceedings remained
the order of the day until 1953. In that year, a breach was opened
by the decision in Brown v. Allen."I Focusing on the federal habeas
corpus statute and collateral questions arising under it, the Supreme Court there approved a federal district court's consideration, on an application for habeas corpus, of constitutional claims
6 See generally 3 W. BLAcxsToNr, COMMENTARIES * 129-38.
7 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K.C. 1670).
' Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
9 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
10 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915). In Frank, a similar claim to federal habeas relief was rejected because the state court
had afforded the prisoner an adequate opportunity to be heard on it. This jurisdictional
concept was expanded in 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst,.304 U.S. 458 (1938), where the Court
held that complete denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel deprived a district court
of "jurisdiction" to impose a prison sentence upon the uncounseled defendant. Thus, the
claim could be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding.
11 344 U.S. 443 (1953). To some extent, Brown was foreshadowed by Waley v. Johnston,
316 U.S. 101 (1942). Decided in 1942 and involving a claim of outrageous coercion of a
guilty plea, Waley held, not in jurisdictional terms, that the federal habeas corpus statute had
enlarged the common law writ such that a prisoner could use the writ to assert a claim of
constitutional' deprivation if the claim was dependent upon facts outside the record and
could not have been asserted in the direct proceedings.
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of racial discrimination in jury selection and admission into evidence of coerced confessions during the state court proceedings.
The old jurisdictional dichotomy-void or voidable-was not employed. But the door was not flung wide. Consideration of such
issues was proper, provided the state court's resolution of, or
failure to consider, the issue did not rest on an adequate and
independent state ground. Thus, the merits of the claims of one of
the several applicants in Brown were not reached because he had
been one day late in perfecting his appeal to the state's .supreme
court and that court's declination to consider the merits rested on
an adequate and independent state ground. 2 In the days when
many criminal defendants were without the assistance of a lawyer,
this limitation was substantial.
The modern era did not really dawn until 1963 and Fay v.
Noia.1 3 There, the Supreme Court undertook to sweep away all of
the old limitations. A modified form of the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies was retained, but now a state prisoner need
exhaust only such state remedies as were then open and available to
him. Earlier defaults under state procedural requirements were no
longer fatal unless the district court found such a default to have
been both a deliberate and inexcusable by-pass of state
remedies.
In Fay v. Noia, the Court also overruled Darr v. Burford,14 and
held that, henceforth, an application to the Supreme Court for
certiorari would not be a requisite step in exhausting state remedies. The Court observed that "in the overwhelming number of
cases" applications for certiorari were denied because they failed to
meet the criteria for granting certiorari set forth in Rule 19.15 The
time required for "the examination and decision of the large
volume" of such petitions "have unwarrantably taxed the resources
of this Court."'1 6 Applications to the Supreme Court for certiorari
from adverse state decisions were thought to impede, rather than
further, the "goal of prompt and fair criminal justice"17-a goal
better attained by the habeas route through the lower federal
12 "344 U.S. at 482-87.

13 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
14 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (absent special circumstances, state prisoner mvst apply to

United States Supreme Court for certiorari from state court's denial of habeas corpus or
dther collateral relief as prerequisite to his bringing habeas corpus in federal district court).
15 372 U.S. at 437; see U.S. Sup. CT. R. 19.
16 372 U.S. at 437.
17 Id.
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courts. There, a state court record could be supplemented if it was
deficient in any respect while the interests of the states were
protected by the Supreme Court's ultimate power to review the
judgment of the federal courts.
Surely, Mr. Justice Brennan and the majority were right in
moving to relieve the Supreme Court of its impossibly burdensome
responsibility for primary review of federal claims arising in connection with state prosecutions. The Court was deeply engaged in
an expanding reexamination and reinterpretation of the Bill of
Rights, extending the protections of those amendments through
the fourteenth to persons accused of state crimes. The continuing
process at once made federal review of federal questions that arose
in state court prosecutions more imperative and thus the commitment of greater judicial resources to the process essential. Since the
Supreme Court's resources were already being taxed, reserves to
fill the breach had to be sought elsewhere. It may not have been
entirely coincidental that Gideon v. Wainwright'8 was decided on the
same day as Fay v. Noia.
Fay v. Noia, with the detailed guidelines so carefully laid down
in Townsend v. Sain,19 wrought a great change in the writ of habeas
corpus. In the ten years since 1963, it has been further changed in
an effort to adapt it to its new purpose. The Court has largely
abandoned the old limitation that habeas corpus is available only to
question the authority by which the petitioner is immediately held
in custody, 20 and has also eliminated the deterrent effect of the
possibility that greater punishment will be imposed on retrial by
proscribing such retribution in resentencing. 2 1
Still, the modified writ is ill-adapted to its new purpose. Few
people today will find fault with the Supreme Court for doing what
it did in 1963. Since it could not provide requisite federal review of
federal questions arising in criminal prosecutions-and assuredly it
could not-the Court very properly turned to the only other means
available to it. With all the adaptations of the writ, and all the
protections thrown around its use, however, experience over the
Is

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (enunciating precise rules governing habeas corpus and holding
that federal district court must provide evidentiary hearing to state prisoner who petitions
for habeas corpus and alleges deprivation of his constitutional rights, where record fails to
disclose whether state courts had applied proper constitutional standards).
20 See the development from Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), through
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), to Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
21 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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last ten years has proven it a singularly slow and wasteful device to
correct deprivations of constitutional rights in the course of criminal prosecutions.
The deficiencies of the writ of habeas corpus as a vehicle for
the review of federal questions in state court convictions were
considered at some length in my article in the American Bar
Association Journal.2 2 I will not repeat here all that was said there,
but a few brief references should suffice.
The most glaring defect stems from the requirement of the
exhaustion of state remedies. A state prisoner with a federal claim
must pursue the claim through the entire state court system-the
trial court, the intermediate appellate court (if there is one) and the
state supreme court. He may then seek a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, but under Fay v. Noia he need not. The Supreme
Cou-t has told him to go instead to the district court and that is the
practical thing for him to do, even though his ultimate hope is
access to the United States Supreme Court. He then must begin
again a relitigation of his claim through the federal system-the
trial court, the court of appeals, and, finally, an application for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. If, in the
process, it is found that the claim asserted in the federal court was
not the claim asserted in and considered by the state courts, he is
returned to the state court system to start all over again. Because
the principles of res judicata are not fully applicable, however, he
can try and try again. Many file successive petitions-five, ten,
twenty, or more-and each petition requires consideration by both
judicial systems to the extent that each raises a fresh claim. Meanwhile, time, measured in years, drags on. A state of finality is never
reached, and the burden of litigation and relitigation is intolerable
for the prisoner, for the courts, and for the public.
This situation is exacerbated because the prisoner is usually
remanded to prison when the direct proceedings are ended, where
he usually loses contact with his lawyer. Until he can state a
postconviction claim which facially entitles him to relief, he is
dependent upon the advice ofjailhouse lawyers. They have a little
learning in the law, but because they are not trained professionals,
they engender false hopes that produce great frustrations. However guilty a prisoner may be of the substantive offense, denial of
his false hopes leaves him with a sense that his constitutional rights
have been ignored and that justice has not been done. This
22

See note 4 supra.
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phenomenon becomes more deeply impressed upon me daily; it
has been recognized in the recent report of the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals2 3 and also by
Professors Rosenberg and Carrington.
This alienation of prisoners has a very unfortunate adverse
impact upon their potential for rehabilitation. Even before frustration-sets in, a prisoner with pending petitions or review proceedings has his hope in judicial release-not in parole. If the corrective
and rehabilitative functions are to be served, it is of tremendous
importance to reach a final judgment on all of the prisoner's legal
and constitutional claims as promptly, fairly, and efficiently as is
possible.
As a result of Fay v. Noia, the number of postconviction claims
in which a prisoner challenged his conviction or his sentence in the
federal district courts ballooned to 12,392 in fiscal 1970.24 By fiscal
1973, they declined to 10,800, but they still constitute a very
appreciable load upon the district courts.2 5 In the courts of appeals
in fiscal 1973, there were 2,141 such cases, over sixteen percent of
the total case load in the courts of appeals. 6 Since each state
prisoner case must be processed through all state.-court levels,
dependence upon postconviction procedures is as much a burden
on state courts as it is on federal courts.
In cases where federal claims arise in connection with state
court convictions, any mechanism for federal review which requires
the lower federal courts to function in tandem with, rather than
parallel to, the state courts is abrasive. The National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals takes the
view that no federal trial judge should have the power to overturn
a conviction which has been upheld through a state's system of
appellate courts. 27 Its recommendation is that federal review of
federal questions arising in state court convictions should be in the
federal courts of appeals. Unless the scope of the federal writ of
habeas corpus were greatly altered, however, this would impose an
impossible burden on the courts of appeals.
Fay v. Noia was a "noble experiment," the phrase with which
President Hoover referred to the eighteenth amendment. Hoover
23 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT

ON COURTS 113 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS].
24 See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

ANNUAL REPORT 11-27 (Table 20) (Preliminary, FY 1973).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 11-8 (Table 5). 27 COURTS 128, 131.
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recognized that noble experiment to be a failure. Today we all
should recognize that the makeshift device which the Supreme
Court fashioned as the only alternative available to it has also
proven to be an abject-failure. Now, with disappointment, we must
understand that the hopes of Fay v. Noia are incapable of realization. Waste, inefficiency, delay, postponement, frustration, and
endless repetition are all too inherent in the process to be eliminated.
II
A

NATIONAL

COURT OF APPEALS

If the Supreme Court had no other means of providing
federal review for federal questions arising in state court convictions, the Congress does have the means. It may create a national
court of appeals having jurisdiction to review, on writs of
certiorari, 28 all federal questions arising in convictions in the state
and federal systems. Because the system of corrections is so closely
related to the judicial functions, I think the new court should have
similar jurisdiction to review all cases adjudicating other rights of
both federal and state prisoners, including such claims as the
deprivation of access to the courts and of rights to reasonable
correspondence, the arbitrary imposition of punitive measures or
the deprivation of accrued rights and credits, and the denial of
religious freedom and reasonable medical services. I think the
court should be given jurisdiction to hear and determine cases
unrelated to crimes and the rights of imprisoned persons which
may be referred to it by the Supreme Court.
I include in the new court's jurisdiction federal cases involving
federal convictions and federal prisoner claims because the court
should serve a unifying function. It is imperative that the same
federal constitutional principles and standards be applied with
reasonable consistency in every state in the union and in every
federal district and circuit. This can be. accomplished only if the
new court reviews decisions of the courts of appeals just as it
reviews decisions of the highest courts of the states.
28 1 have suggested the certiorari device because of its convenience in disposing of cases
which do not merit review. It should be made plain, however, that the court would be
expected to grant the writ in every case in which a substantial, unsettled federal question is
presented. Its jurisdiction should be discretionary only in the sense that the court need not
take insubstantial cases. It should not decline review because there is no conflict in the lower
courts or for the kindred reasons which influence denial of review in the Supreme Court.
Requiring leave to appeal would serve the purpose equally well.
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The cases which I suppose the court would hear and determine on reference from the Supreme Court would not be cases
involving large constitutional questions. The most likely category of
such referenced cases would be those involving conflicts in statutory interpretation or decisional law which should be resolved for
the sake of uniformity and predictability in the law. In that respect,
the new court would serve to unify the law for the entire nation-a
function for which the Supreme Court may have inadequate resources as long as there are many important constitutional questions pressing for determination.
In the American Bar Association Journal article, I discussed
rather specifically some suggestions concerning the number of
judges for the new court, a central staff, and the court's power to
direct further proceedings in the lower courts, including the power
to remand a case for supplementation of the record and further
fact-finding.2 9 With respect to the cases coming to the new court on
petitions for certiorari, I also had specific suggestions about provisions for further review in the Supreme Court, provisions which I
think are quite adequate to preserve the Supreme Court's overlordship, its supervision and control of its own docket, and its
ultimate authority in the application and development of the law. 30
With respect to the cases taken by the new court on reference
from the Supreme Court, I would also permit subsequent application to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari. By hypothesis, a
referred case would probably be of little moment beyond the need
to resolve conflicts between subordinate courts and to establish a
uniform rule henceforth to be followed by all subordinate courts.
However, if such a case were decided in the new court, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court would wish to reconsider it on its merits;
but I would not wish to foreclose the possibility, for more may
appear involved after decision by the new court than was apparent
from the original petition for certiorari.
Once such a national court of appeals is established, I would
limit the federal writ of habeas corpus and motions under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to federal claims which were not and could not have
been presented to the new court through earlier direct or collateral
proceedings. A permissible claim, for example, would be that the
29 See Haynsworth, supra note 4, at 842-43. The proposal includes a specific suggestion
that appropriate cases could be remanded to a United States district judge, who would act as
a special master, for further hearings and fact-finding. The device would be available in any
case where the adequacy or fairness of the fact-finding processes in the trial court was
suspect.
30 Id. at 843.
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lawyer's representation in the trial and direct review proceedings
was constitutionally inadequate. I would preserve the exhaustionof-remedies requirement, however, so that a state prisoner with
such a claim would be required to assert it first in the state courts.
Having had an opportunity to apply to the national court of
appeals for a writ of certiorari to the state court, he would be
foreclosed from any subsequent petition in the lower federal
courts. The only state prisoner claims that then could be maintained in the federal system would be those federal claims which
could not be maintained in the state courts either because of an
absence of adequate remedies or because of procedural defaults
which the state court held to have foreclosed the claim.
This proposars advantages seem to me to be as great as they
are obvious. In place of our slow and bungling system of collateral
review, there would be substituted a system of direct review, which
would be expected to function much more promptly, effectively,
and efficiently. Criminal convictions after direct review would be
clothed with a substantial degree of finality. The quality of justice
should be greatly enhanced and most of the deficiencies of the
present system of collateral review would be avoided. The federal
writ of habeas corpus would shrink from its present inflated
dimension, but its new dimension would exceed its traditional one.
Finally, there would be no problem with the constitutional prohibition against suspension of the writ.
With respect to cases involving the rights of prison inmates,
the statute should require the prior exhaustion of all adequate
administrative remedies and, with respect to state prisoners, the
prior exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Today, state prisoners
are given direct access to the federal courts under statutes enacted
during the Reconstruction Period following the Civil War. 3 1 There
is no reason for the continuance of such rights of direct access.
State courts are fully competent to adjudicate these claims and
should be involved in the process of prison reform that evolves
from the successful prosecution of prisoner rights cases. As long as
the state court judgments are reviewable in the national court of
appeals, the federal questions in those cases remain subject to full
and adequate federal review.
In addition to a great improvement in the promptness and
efficiency with which justice would be administered, the proposal
would also provide substantial relief for overcrowded courts-at all
levels. In the federal system, the district courts would be relieved of
31 R.S. 751-66 (1878), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
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substantially all state prisoner cases, which in fiscal year 1973
numbered 12,683.32 It would also substantially reduce the number
of petitions by federal prisoners under section 2255. In the courts
of appeals, there would be similar relief. In fiscal year 1973, the
33
postconviction and state prisoner rights cases numbered 2,619,
most of which would be removed from the -dockets of the courts of
appeals under my proposal. Even at the Supreme Court level,
there would be a substantial reduction in the number of petitions
for certiorari because in this area the Court would then have the
decisions of only one national court of appeals to review rather
than, as now, those of the highest courts of fifty states and eleven
federal circuits.
Introduction of a substantial degree of finality in criminal
convictions after direct review would also greatly reduce the case
loads of all state courts, since repetitive and successive claims would
largely be barred.
Thus, at the cost of the creation and operation of a court of
nine judges with national jurisdiction, substantial economies could
be effected in all other courts in the federal and state judicial
systems, and substantial relief provided for them. Adoption of the
proposal would directly improve the quality of justice in this area
and, by reducing case loads, it would indirectly tend to improve the
quality of justice in other areas.
III
COMPATIBILITY WITH

CERTAIN OTHER PROPOSALS

A.

National Advisory Commission
After close observation of the English courts, Professor Daniel
J. Meador of the University of Virginia wrote a remarkable little
book,. Criminal Appeals: English Practice and American Reforms. He
served as Chairman of the Task Force on Courts of the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
The Commission has now incorporated many of his ideas in its
recommendations found in Chapter 6 of its Report on Courts relat34
ing to review of trial court proceedings.
The report of the National Advisory Commission contemplates
a greatly expedited and expanded direct review procedure for the
11

See

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED

ANNUAL REPORT 11-27 (Table 20) (Preliminary, FY 1973).

33 Id.
34 COURTS 140-43.

STATES COURTS,
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initial reviewing court in the federal and state systems. Expedition
would result from a requirement that the prosecutor immediately
order a full transcript of all trial court proceedings in every case in
which an appeal was likely. Expansion of the review proceeding
would result, in part, from a complete review by a central staff of
the transcript for possible questions which had not been raised by
the defendant or counsel. Further expansion would come from a
requirement that motions for new trials be lodged with the reviewing court and passed upon by it. Still further, the central staff
would make a searching inquiry of the defendant, defense counsel,
and the prosecutor in an attempt to discover any additional claim
not apparent on the record. The defendant might claim, for
instance, that his lawyer neglected to call five witnesses who could
have established conclusively the defendant's alibi. The reviewing
court would determine any claim thus revealed by staff inquiry and
could call upon the trial court for any additional fact-finding
deemed necessary.
After the first appellate court's comprehensive review of all
issues apparent on the record or made apparent by subsequent
motion or inquiry, subsequent review would be sharply curtailed
under the Commission's recommendations. Subsequent review
would be allowed in those instances where: (1) an appellate court
finds that the public interest in the development of the law or in
the maintenance of uniformity would be served by a further
hearing, (2) the defendant claims newly discovered evidence raises
substantial doubt about his guilt, or (3) the defendant claims a
constitutional violation which, if true, would undermine the integrity of the trial or review proceeding, or impair the reliability of the
fact-finding process.
In addition to these proposals relating to proceedings within a
single judicial system, the Commission also addressed itself to
federal review of federal claims arising in state court prosecutions.
In its Standard 6.5, the Commission suggests that any federal
review of state court convictions should be in the federal courts of
appeals.3 5 Seemingly, this procedure is intended to apply only to
collateral attacks because in its Commentary following the Standard, the Commission states that (subject to the limitations outlined
above) subsequent review of state convictions may occur "in the
U.S. Supreme Court, or in any other Federal court designated by
'3
Congress for that purpose. 6
The recommendations of the Commission insofar as they are
"

35 Id. at 128.
36 Id. at 129.-
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directed to swift and comprehensive review-patterned substantially after the English model-are thoroughly "ommendable and
also fully compatible with fly proposal of a national court of appeals. I agree generally with the Commission's effort to cut off
collateral proceedings following the comprehensive initial review it
contemplates but I am disturbed about the limitations it would
place upon federal review of federal claims arising in a state court
prosecution. Two members of the Commission dissented, one of
them specifically on the ground that he disapproved of the limitations on subsequent federal review of state court convictions.37
I infer from the reference to "any other Federal court designated by Congress" that the Commission contemplated the possibility that Congress might create a national court of appeals to serve
that purpose. If a national court is created and given a discretionary jurisdiction, however, it ought not be required to make preliminary determinations and findings before it can exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction. A grant of certiorari may imply that the
court, or a substantial minority thereof thinks that the case presents
issues substantially meeting the standards of the Commission's
proposal. But neither the national court nor the Supreme Court
ought to be required to explain its grant of certiorari or to justify it
with preliminary determinations of matters which may be debatable.
As long as we are primarily dependent upon collateral proceedings for federal review of federal questions in state court
proceedings (as we now are) I would deplore the recommendation
which would limit such review to the federal courts of appeals. The
courts of appeals have more than enough to do now, even when, as
in many cases, they are tremendously assisted by full opinions
prepared by district judges. If collateral review is subject to the
expressed limitations-and apparently it is-then federal review of
claims such as unlawful search and seizure seem unduly restrictive.
I am firmly convinced, of course, of the necessity for federal
review, at some point, of federal claims. It will be much better if
federal review can be accomplished directly through a national
court of appeals; but until that is provided, I would not favor
restrictions upon such review in the lower federal courts.
B.

Professors Carrington and Rosenberg

Professor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia sent me a copy of
a paper that he and Professor Paul D. Carrington of Michigan
had prepared for tentative submission to the Advisory Council for
17

Id. at 319-30 (dissent by Mr. Stanley C. Van Ness).
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Justice. 38

Appellate
It is a thoughtful paper. They, as I, seek a
better means for federal review of federal questions arising in state
court convictions and also the introduction of a degree of finality to
state court convictions. They recognize the detrimental effects of
prolonged postconviction proceedings upon the prisoner as well as
upon the courts and society. They express concern, however, -that
creation of a special court designed primarily to hear criminal
appeals might be thought "to stamp criminal cases as requiring
only second class treatment." 39
Their tentative proposal is a merger of the present United
States courts of appeals into one national court. Some of the judges
would sit in regional panels, much as they now do, while others
would serve on national panels, each national panel hearing and
deciding designated classes of cases. One of those national panels
would be authorized to hear and decide federal questions arising in
state prosecutions, while other national panels of the merged court
would be authorized to hear other classes of cases arising in both
federal and state systems.
Professors Rosenberg and Carrington seek the same general
end that I do, but it may not be surprising that I have a preference
for my own idea about the means for getting there. Merging the
courts of appeals with a system of rotation of individual circuit
judges in and out of regional and national panels would create
monumental administrative problems. In many respects, such national panels could serve a unifying function temporarily; but I
have grave doubt of the precedential weight of their decisions,
except in subordinate courts.
In a court such as mine, every nonsitting judge has an opportunity to criticize each proposed opinion and, on appropriate
occasions, they unreluctantly avail themselves of that opportunity. 40
38 An unpublished working paper to be completed and submitted to the Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice entitled A PreliminaryReport on the Revision of the FederalCourt
Appellate System, by Paul D. Carrington and Maurice Rosenberg. The substance of the ideas
embodied in that paper is contained in Professor Rosenberg's Cornell lecture. See Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility To Meet ChangingNeeds of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 576 (1974).
-1 Id. at 587.
40 In the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, decisions are not just panel decisions.
When copies of a proposed opinion go to the other members of the panel, copies also go to
the nonsitting members of the court. The nonsitting members are encouraged to speak up
with constructive criticism and suggestions. If one or more of them think an important and
possibly recurrent principle of law is involved, the whole court becomes actively involved. If
a majority of the whole court disagrees with a majority of the panel, we have the case
resubmitted to the court en banc. In the absence of such disagreement, the panel alone takes
formal action. Nevertheless, the nonsitting judges have a sense of participation in the
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Thus, every judge of the court readily accepts a prior decision of
the court as binding, unless a majority of the whole court is
prepared to depart from it. Each judge has an opportunity to be
heard. Moreover, if reconsideration seems appropriate at a later
time, the whole court can readily be involved in the process. If all
of the courts of appeals were merged, such reconsideration would
be impractical. Prior decisions of a national panel would probably
be accorded no more than a becoming respect by successor panels,
composed of judges who would have no sense of participation in
the earlier decision. Indeed, a panel decision practically should not
be given any greater effect. A panel can make a mistake. Furthermore, the law changes; it grows. 4 1 Subsequent panels must be free
to correct earlier errors and to reflect a wholesome development of
the law. Otherwise, some mechanism comparable to en banc review
would be an absolute necessity, for the Supreme Court could not
shoulder the burden of the close review required to handle situations of this kind.
As the courts of appeals are presently organized, by formal or
informal en banc consideration, each may avoid this problem
without stifling the law's growth. If merged, consideration by the
whole court would seem impossible. However, if a national panel is
free to disregard an earlier decision, the later holding may reflect
no more than a normal disagreement among judges. That possibility would tend to encourage litigants and lawyers to pursue appeals
despite prior adverse decisions.
I prefer a simpler solution to the problem we recognize-a
solution that avoids involving other litigants in areas where there is
no such problem and also avoids broad administrative rearrangements of the courts which may prove in practice to be unworkable.
I do not think my proposal can fairly be regarded as offering
second class treatment to persons convicted of crimes. Although it
would route their federal claims to a new court, the purpose of this
change is improvement in the quality of justice they get as well as
the promptness with which they get it. That should also be the
effect. I regard my proposal as providing preferential treatment
for the convicted; compared with oiher classes of litigants, they
decision because those judges on or off the panel who disagree with the result have had their
say. In consequence, when the same question comes up again, regardless of the membership
of the panel, the panel readily recognizes the authority of the eartlier case.
In some of the other courts of appeals, a nonsitting judge does not see most opinions
until after they are announced. An en banc rehearing in such courts, however, can provide
the same necessary continuity and unity.
41 Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d. 650, 655 (4th Cir. 1973).
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would have a proportionately larger opportunity for decisions on
the merits of their federal claims by_ a court having nationwide
jurisdiction, the decisions of which would be binding upon all lower
tribunals.
It would be nice, of course, if we could have literal equality,
routing all litigants with federal claims to the Supreme Court. All
three of us, however, are agreed that the Supreme Court's resources are unequal to the task. Because of their numbers and the
need for present dependence upon collateral proceedings for federal review of their claims, criminal defendants are now a disadvantaged class of litigants. A court specifically designed to give preferred, prompt, and adequate attention to their claims seems to me
as much as one might ask. Professors Rosenberg and Carrington
would achieve a semblance.of literal equality in the treatment of
litigants, but it may not be worth the price, if the price is a general
reorganization of all of the courts of appeals and the involvement
of all litigants in untried judicial systems.
C.

Freund Commission

The Federal Judicial Center Report of the Study Group on the
Case Load of the Supreme Court (December 1972), commonly
known as the Freund Commission Report,4 2 contains much that
readily commends itself. The statutory three-judge district court,
with a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court, has been an
abomination for a long time. Such appeals tax the resources of the
Supreme Court, and their cumbersome handling strains the energies of judges in the lower federal courts. The Freund proposal
that they be abolished is widely applauded.
Senator Burdick has suggested preserving the statutory threejudge district court for legislative reapportionment and federal
redistricting cases. 43 There may be some argument in support of
his position with respect to those cases, but in general I heartily
approve the Freund proposal that the compulsory appellate juris44
diction of the Supreme Court be abolished entirely.
The Freund Commission proposal of a screening court is now
only of academic interest. If it was not mortally wounded by the
initial blasts of former Chief Justice Earl Warren, 4 5 former Justice
41 STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

REPORT (1972).
"' See S. 663, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. 271, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
44 See STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, .upra note 42, at 34, 47.
4- See Burger & Warren, Retired ChiefJustice Warren Attacks, ChiefJusticeBurger Defends
Freund Study Group's Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 724-30 (1973).
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Arthur Goldberg,46 and others, it recently received the coup de gr~ce
47
from Mr. Justice Brennan.
It is to be wished that the Study Group had looked beyond the
Supreme Court's doorstep and sought means to reduce the input
of controversies into the judicial system. The criticism of the proposed screening court, however, was based upon the premise that it
would deprive the Supreme Court of control of its own docket. I
propose no such thing.
To reduce the volume of useless petitions inundating the Supreme Court, I would deny an applicant for certiorari to the new
national court of appeals the right to seek further review in the
Supreme Court if the national court of appeals denied his petition
without a dissenting voice. If the court of appeals disposed of a
case on the merits or denied certiorari with one or more dissents, I
would allow the applicant to seek further review in the Supreme
Court. To that extent, this feature of my proposal means the new
court would have a screening function. However, I would preserve
the Supreme Court's control by giving it authority, on its own
motion, to grant writs of certiorari to the national court of appeals
or to any lower court in any case pending in the national court of
appeals or denied review there. With a small central staff, the
Supreme Court could monitor the docket of the national court of
appeals and call up any case which it thought appropriate for
consideration. While preserving the Supreme Court's power and its
control over its own docket, this procedure would protect the
justices from frivolous petitions. However, since this feature is not
essential to my proposal, it should be abandoned if the Justices
think this very narrow limitation objectionable.
D. Judge Friendly
I heartily commend to you Judge Henry J. Friendly's very
thoughtful book. 48 Judge Friendly will be here later to speak for
himself, but I particularly like his suggestions which would take
several classes of cases out of the general federal courts. I think he
demonstrates that those classes of cases can be handled as well, or
better, elsewhere. I thoroughly shafe his conviction that such
surgery is essential if the federal judicial system is to avoid breakdowns and function efficiently in the future.
16 See Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14-16; The
Case Against a National Court of Appeals, Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1973, at A-14, col. 4.
47 Brennan, The National Courtof Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. R~v. 473 (1973).
4' See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 1. See also Haynsworth, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1082 (1974).
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E. John P. Frank
In 1969, former Professor and now practicing lawyer John P.
Frank wrote a book that has been too little noticed. It has a bold
title: American Law: The Case for Radical Reform. What seemed
radical to him in 1969 seems very moderate in 1973. The intervening years have simply confirmed his concern that judicial resources are not profitably allocated. They are not expended
profitably when devoted to resolving technical questions that could
be avoided without violation of essential fairness. Correctly, he
points out that each "decision point" is costly to the litigants directly
involved, to the courts, and to other litigants whose trials are
delayed by judicial attention to other cases. He questions whether
even the new rules governing choice of law are warranted. Our
search for a 'juster justice" in particular cases may so divert
resources as to create delays and deny justice in other cases. A
simplistic, inflexible rule may have greater virtue in a system
threatened with overtaxation of its resources.
Chief Justice Burger has requested the Congress to consider
the impact ofnew legislation on the courts. 4 9 Judge Friendly has
questioned the advisability of placing the burdens of fact-finding
on the federal courts when an administrative agency could do as
well. 50
I endorse no specific proposal here, but the Congress and the
courts should be acutely aware of John Frank's point. We should
not require successive hearings, judicial trials, and retrials without
regard to the needs of fairness. Even when considerations of
fairness in particular cases point in one direction, their force
should be considered in the light of the institution's capacity to
assume additional burdens without inflicting greater unfairness
upon others.
IV
JUDICIAL SELECTION

Many people seem greatly concerned about the method of
selection of the judges who will man such a national court of
appeals as I propose. I think it should be a new article III court
staffed by judges appointed by the President with the advice and
19

Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciary-1972,58 A.B.A.J. 1049, 1050 (1972). The

Chief Justice is providing splendid leadership in the movements to reform and improve our

judicial systems.
50 H.

FRIENDLY,

supra note 1, at 64.
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consent of the Senate. I think the process has sufficient safeguards
to avoid the polarization or politicization of such a court.
A possible solution to the start-up problem may be an initial
assignment of judges by the Chief Justice for limited terms with
presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of their successors. As an illustration, if one third of the judges were initially
assigned to a term of three years, another third to a term of six
years, and the final third to a term of nine years, with provision for
filling vacancies by assignment but lodging the power to appoint
successors after expiration of the term in the President after
confirmation by the Senate, no President could appoint the whole
court. Under such an arrangement, the likelihood that a majority
of the judges would die or retire during the term of any future
President would be minimized.
CONCLUSION

By different means, Professors Rosenberg, Carrington, and
Meador, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, and I are seeking methods for better adjudicating the claims of criminal defendants and also for substantially eliminating the practice of postconviction review. With the
same kind of institutional concern, Judge Friendly proposes the
withdrawal of several classes of cases from the jurisdiction of the
general federal courts.
Each proposal differs in detail, though there is a large measure
of compatibility between them. Except in their minor differences,
one may embrace them all. It is not essential that everything be
done at once, but it is urgent that we move on all of these fronts.
We cannot afford the luxury of leaving any of these proposals on
the fence for reflection some other day. No one of them, alone, will
provide a perfect solution, but together they can work wonders.
Little measures are not appropriate, for the continuing health of
the federal judicial system is in grave and immediate danger.

